Implicational constructions in English[1]

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Abstract
Constructionist approaches[3] have highlighted that language is a structured inventory of constructions which are operational at all levels of grammatical analysis. In contrast with other kinds of constructions such as argument structure constructions, implicational constructions have received little scholarly attention. The aim of this paper is to examine the morphosyntactic and pragmatic properties of a range of implicational constructions within the framework of the Lexical Constructional Model (LCM).[4] Implicational constructions arise from the conventionalization of inferences derived from the metonymic activation of low-level situational cognitive models.[5] The similarities on the pragmatic level between some of these constructions lead us to postulate families of constructions.[6]

Key words: construction, constructional family, implication, cognitive model, metonymy.

0. Introduction

Constructional views in the cognitive linguistics paradigm[7] have emphasized the fact that language is a structured inventory of constructions. Constructions can be defined as follows[8] (Ruiz de Mendoza 2013):

> a form-meaning (or function) pairing where form affords access to meaning and meaning is realized by form to the extent that such processes have become entrenched, through sufficient use, in the speaker's mind and are generally recognized by competent speakers of the language in question to be stably associated or are at least potentially replicable by other competent speakers of the same language with immaterial variation in its form and meaning.

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[3] See for instance Goldberg, *Constructions*, *Constructions at Work*.
[4] Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal, "High-level metaphor and metonymy", ""Levels of description" and "Constraints on syntactic alternations"; Mairal and Ruiz de Mendoza, "Internal and external constraints", "Levels of description" and "New challenges for lexical representation"; Ruiz de Mendoza, "Cross-linguistic analysis" and "Meaning construction, meaning interpretation"; Butler, "The Lexical Constructional Model".
[5] Ruiz de Mendoza and Gonzálvez-García.
[6] Gonzálvez-García, " Passives without actives", "Towards a constructionist reappraisal of interpersonal manipulation", "The interaction between coercion and constructional polysemy", "Measuring out reflexivity", "The family of object-related depictives" and "Metaphor and metonymy".
[7] Lakoff, *Women, Fire*; Langacker, *Cognitive Grammar*; *Concept, Image, Symbol*; Goldberg *Constructions*, *Constructions at Work*; Croft; Michaelis.
[8] Ruiz de Mendoza, "Meaning construction, meaning interpretation".

Although constructions are operational at all levels of grammatical analysis, Construction Grammar approaches have focused on argument structure constructions, which provide the basic means of clausal expression in a language. Argument structure constructions are to be distinguished from other kinds of construction, namely implicational, illocutionary and discourse constructions, which go beyond the level of the clause. The focus of the present contribution is on implicational constructions, which capture meaning that arises from the way the speaker interacts with the lexical and grammatical properties of utterances.[9] Implicational constructions have attracted little attention in constructionist approaches. There have not been any unified accounts of inferential constructions, with the exception of the *What's X Doing Y?* construction discussed by Kay and Fillmore (1999), the *It Is That-clause* construction[10] and the double *be* or copula doubling.[11] Research within the Lexical Constructional Model (LCM) has focused on argument-structure constructions[12], illocutionary constructions[13] and discourse constructions.[14]

With the general sketch of the constructionist approach and the LCM framework in mind, this paper sets out to exemplify and validate the LCM by identifying and discussing a number of likely candidates for the phenomenon implicational constructions. We posit a model of implicature which differentiates implicational constructions according to their degree of conventionalization.

The structure of the paper is as follows. The first section provides an overview of the Lexical Constructional Model and a general characterization of implicational constructions in this model. This is followed by a detailed discussion of a corpus of implicational constructions. We explain their morphosyntactic properties and the range

[9] Mairal and Ruiz de Mendoza, "Levels of description", 165.
[10] Koops.
[11] Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal.
[12] See for instance Peña.
[13] See for instance Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez; Del Campo.
[14] See for instance Gómez, Ruiz de Mendoza and Gonzálvez-García.

of contextual interpretations the constructions are sensitive to. The last section presents some concluding remarks.

1. Implicational constructions in the Lexical Constructional Model

In contrast with Construction Grammar approaches, the LCM is a comprehensive model of language that accounts for all aspects involved in meaning construction, including traditional implicature, illocutionary force and discourse coherence. In the LCM, which is based on moderate functional models of language (especially Role and Reference Grammar) and cognitive linguistics (particularly Goldberg's Construction Grammar and Lakoff's Cognitive Semantics), constructions are distributed among four levels of representation that interact in principled ways: argument structure (level 1), implicature (level 2), illocution (level 3) and discourse (level 4). Argumental constructions are considered part of the core-grammar level of description, or level 1. Then the LCM distinguishes between three kinds of non-argumental constructions[15]: (i) level 2 or *implicational* constructions; (ii) level 3 or illocutionary constructions, which deal with meaning that arises from the way speakers interact on the basis of fully modalized argument-predicate configurations; (iii) level 4 or discourse constructions, which deal with how the speaker creates connectedness in his speech production on the basis of all other aspects of the semantic configuration of utterances.

These four layers are built upon two basic cognitive processes and four basic cognitive models.[16] The cognitive operations are subsumption and cueing. This means that each level is either subsumed (or built) into higher level structure or acts as a cue for the activation of relevant conceptual structure that yields an implicit meaning derivation.

The basic cognitive models proposed by the LCM fall within four types: (i) low-level non-situational cognitive models, which roughly correspond to argument structure lexical predicates (e.g. *walk, destroy, take*); (ii) high-level non-situational cognitive models (e.g. notions such as "process", "result", "action"), which underlie level-1 constructions but are also operational, when used in logical (e.g. "action-result"), temporal (e.g. "simultaneity") and conceptual connections (e.g. "contrast") at the discourse level; (iii) low-level situational cognitive models (e.g. "going to the doctor", "ordering a meal"), which make up the conceptual structure of level-2 constructions;

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[15] Mairal and Ruiz de Mendoza, "Levels of description", 165.
[16] Ruiz de Mendoza and Gonzálvez-García, 76.

and, finally, (iv) high-level situational cognitive models (e.g. "promising", "suggesting") which constitute the conceptual material of level-3 constructions.

In the LCM implicational constructions pertain to level 2 of representation. At level 2, syntactic configurations are seen as ways of restructuring level-1 information with a view to showing how the speaker interacts with it. A challenging assumption of the LCM, which differentiates it from traditional pragmatic theories, is that implicational meaning may have a constructional motivation.[17] The meaning of numerous implicational constructions is obtained on the basis of a combination of pragmatically guided and constructionally guided situational-based low-level inferencing.

A further claim of the LCM is that the constructions do not yield the conventional implication directly. Rather, the implicational meaning is derivable from a low-level situational cognitive model, which is to be understood as a conventional series of events that are coherently related to one another. The first event would be the previous condition for the implication to be derived. The literal meaning of the construction would represent the core event, and the last event in the situational ICM would be the conventional implication. Consider the low-level situational cognitive model for the *Wh- Do You Think You BE-present V-ing* (e.g. *What do you think you are doing?*) construction as a way of illustrating this notion:

PREVIOUS CONDITION: A is doing something that the speaker doesn't like.

CORE EVENT: S questions this action.

A is aware of the situation.

IMPLICATION: S challenges A's behaviour.

Another novel postulate of the LCM is that situational cognitive models may be grounded on high-level metaphorical and metonymical processes. The view of implicational meaning as the result of metonymic activity on low-level situational models is expounded in Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal[18] and is in line with the LCM's assumption that constructions are constrained by external, i.e. semantic factors (e.g. lexical class membership of the verb) and internal, i.e. cognitive factors (e.g. high-level

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[17] In the Gricean scheme (1975) conversational implicature is created by any type of breach of the maxims.

[18] Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal, "High-level metaphor and metonymy".

metaphor and high-level metonymy). High-level metaphor and high-level metonymy make use of generic-level conceptual structure and are operational at the grammatical level.[19] Two examples are GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC (e.g. *I'll do the dishes*) and ACTIONS ARE TRANSFERS (e.g. *They gave the thug a big beating*). This postulate is one of the major novelties of the LCM as compared with other cognitive/functional frameworks.

Thus, the low-level situational model that constitutes the conceptual structure of the construction *Wh- Do You Think You Be-present V-ing* relies upon the metonymy ACTION FOR (ASSESSED) RESULT, where the action done by the hearer stands for the negative effect it produces.

The present contribution seeks to exemplify and validate the LCM by identifying and discussing a set of constructions that carry a range of conventionalized implications. Their formal and semantic features will be examined in the next section.

2. A corpus analysis of implicational constructions

2.1. Data selection

To elucidate and illustrate the notion of level-2 construction, we have selected a sample corpus of implicational constructions retrieved from American films and illustrated through examples from online corpora.[20]

Below we list the constructions chosen:

Who Are You?

Who Do You Think You Are?

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[19] Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal, "Constraints on syntactic alternations", 66.

[20] The sources used for data selection are the films *Laws of Attraction* (2004), *In Good Company* (2004) and *Prime* (2005), Google searches and the Corpus of Contemporary American English, available on http://corpus.byu.edu/coca. Our search has been carried out in two stages. In the first stage, we have watched the films to find instances of level-2 constructions. In the second stage, we have looked through the net for additional examples of the constructions encountered in the films.

Don't You Have Anything To Say?

I Know/See You

Wh- Do You Think You BE-present V-ing?

X Is Like Impossible To Y.

Don't You X.

I Thought You Would X.

Are You Kidding?

Are You Crazy/Insane?

What Are You Talking About?

No Kidding.

Name X.

Now You Are Talking.

You Should See X.

The constructions share two important features. First, they all contain the pronoun *you* (explicitly or implicitly, as in imperatives) which can only rarely be replaced by other pronouns. The presence of an addressee emphasizes the *conversational* implicature and the fact that it is created in interaction. Second, a considerable number of constructions require the present tense.

Despite these similarities, the sentences chosen display a range of peculiarities of form and meaning that have led us to posit a taxonomy of implicational constructions that cuts across two dimensions: degree of conventionalization and implicational meaning. The former parameter distinguishes fully-specified constructions that have a fixed structure (e.g. *Now You Are Talking*) from partially-codified constructions, where only some constituents are obligatory, their instantiation potential thus being higher (e.g. *You Should See X*). Table 1 classifies the constructions listed above according to the two parameters.

Degree of specification / Implicature	Fully specified	Partially specified
Anger	*Who Are You?* *Who Do You Think/Believe You Are?*	*Wh- Do You Think You Be-present V–ing?* *Don't You X*
Disapproval	*I Know/See You* *Don't You Have/Haven't You (Got) Anything To Say?*	*X Is Like Impossible To Y*
Disbelief	*Are You Crazy/Insane?* *What Are You Talking About?* *Are You Kidding?* *No Kidding*	
Positive assessment	*Now You Are Talking*	
Certainty		*I Thought You Would Y*
Challenge		*Name X*
Mitigation		*You Should See X*

Table 1. A proposal for a taxonomy of implicational constructions in English.

In the next section we explore their formal, semantic and pragmatic properties.

2.2. Data analysis

The constructions under scrutiny range from fully-specified constructions to partially-specified constructions.

A. Fully-specified constructions

A.1. Constructions conveying the speaker's disapproval of the hearer's action

The constructions *Who Are You?*, *Who Do You Think/Believe You Are?*, *Don't You Have/Haven't You (Got) Anything To Say?* and *I Know/See You* implicate that the speaker disapproves of the hearer's behaviour.

The constructions *Who Are You?* and *Who Do You Think/Believe You Are?* are semantically motivated by the high-level (generic) metonymy ACTION FOR (ASSESSED) RESULT. The action described is taken for granted and the focus is on the detrimental result as assessed by the speaker.

The constructions are based on an identical low-level situational model:

> PREVIOUS CONDITION: A behaves in a socially inappropriate way.
>
> S doesn't like this behaviour.
>
> Power: S feels more powerful than A.
>
> CORE EVENT: S asks A about his/her identity.
>
> IMPLICATION: S challenges A's action.

Since it is evident to H that S knows his identity, the hearer correctly interprets the question. Identity is related to social status and power. The rationale behind the conventionalized implication is the following:

- Unless H's social status allows him to perform action A, H should not perform A. If H has performed A, it means that either H has the power to do A or that H has overstepped H's bounds.

- If it is evident from context that H has no power to do A, then it follows that H has overstepped H's bounds.

In formal terms, the constructions can be provisionally characterized as involving a Wh-interrogative pronoun and a subject pronoun *you*.

1. *Who Are You?*

This construction may have two interpretations depending on the context. It is often read as a conventional *Wh*-question, as in (1):

> (1) - Who are you?
>
>   - I am Linda, the new teacher.

In a context in which the speaker and hearer are already known to each other, the literal meaning is not available, so that the hearer is able to interpret it as the speaker expressing disapproval and challenging his authority. The construction is based on the metonymy AGENT FOR ACTION, where the person doing the action that bothers the speaker (i.e. the hearer) stands for his action, as shown in (2):

(2) Who are you?

Who are you, speaking to me like that?

2. *Who Do You Think/Believe You Are?*

A variant of the construction *Who Are You?* is obtained though the addition of the clause *do you think*. This affects the syntactic status of the clause *you are*, which is embedded within the main clause. A few instances of this construction are provided in (3):

(3) Who do you think you are? I do not pay you - and I pay you well - to lecture me or to override my decisions.

You've got some nerve. Standing me up. Nobody does that to me. Who do you think you are? A big shot?

Who the hell do you think you are?

Who do you believe you are to tell us what to do?

In the last example the phrase *the hell* strengthens the implicational meaning of the construction.

3. *Don't You Have/Haven't You (Got) Anything To Say?*

In some contexts, this construction permits a literal reading, as in (4):

(4) - Haven't you anything to say to me?

- I pitched three innings and I only gave up one hit [in baseball].

Sometimes the construction conveys the idea that the speaker disapproves of the addressee's action and challenges him to provide an explanation. This reading is triggered in contexts exemplified in (5):

(5) You lied and you knew you were lying. Go on, tell me you didn't lie. Haven't you got anything to say about that? You can think up something, can't you?

4. *I Know/See You*

This construction is only compatible with the verbs *know* and *see*. The compatibility of *see* has a cognitive motivation, inasmuch as here it does not function as a perception verb, but as cognition verb on the basis of the conceptual metaphor UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING.[21]

In the utterance in (6) the speaker does not make a statement about the hearer's identity. On the contrary, the construction conjures up a situation in which the speaker makes a negative judgment about the hearer's behaviour.

(6) - His problems are none of your business.

- I'm merely being her friend.

- I know you, Sam.

- Oh, really?

Such negative judgement is derived in the following way:

S knows that H is doing something > S knows that H is doing something that S believes is wrong and that H is not aware that S knows that H is doing something that S believes is wrong. > H is doing something that is wrong.

It is worth mentioning that the implicational meaning of the constructions *Who Are You?* and *Who Do You Think/Believe You Are?* gives rise to the illocutionary value of complaint. The presence of the hearer accounts for the indirectness of the complaint. In this light, the pragmatic parameter of face (i.e. the public self-image of a person in Brown and Levinson's 2000 model) provides the answer to the question of why the speaker voices his complaint indirectly. Since the action represents a cost to the speaker and he feels more powerful than the hearer, he tries to maintain his face by performing a face-saving act.

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[21] Lakoff and Johnson; Lakoff, "Theory of metaphor".

A.2. Constructions conveying the speaker's assessment of the hearer's proposition.

A.2.1. Constructions conveying the speaker's disbelief in relation to the hearer's proposition.

1. *Are You Crazy/Insane?*

In this construction the speaker is not asking about the hearer's mental state but finds there is something wrong with his ideas or future plans, as exemplified in (7-8).

> (7) - I think you like him.
>
> > - Like him? Are you crazy / insane?
>
> (8) - Start a business in this economy? Are you crazy?
>
> > - They got together enough money

2. *What Are You Talking About?*

In some contexts, this construction is easily interpretable as a request for information, as in (9-13):

> (9) We said to them, "What are you talking about as you walk?"
>
> (10) Adelson speaks but what is he talking about?
>
> (11) What is he talking about in chapter 30?
>
> (12) What exactly is he talking about?
>
> (13) Who is this man and what is he talking about?

Sometimes the speaker uses this construction to mean that he does not make sense of the addressee's message. He feels as if he had missed something:

> (14) Aliens? What's he talking about?

In other contexts, the construction conveys the idea that there is something wrong with what the addressee has just said:

> (15) He looked surprised at me and he said, "What are you talking about?"

The construction acquires the extra implicational meaning if talking receives extra stress prominence.

The occurrence with other pronouns cancels the implication, as in (16-17):

(16) What are we talking about today in our second week as President?

(17) What are we talking about in terms of money for education?

The implication becomes stronger through the addition of words conveying the speaker's feelings about the situation (18) or the hearer (19):

(18) What the hell are you talking about?

(19) What are you talking about, ignorant woman?

3. *Are You Kidding?*

In the construction the protagonist of the described situation is not making a joke, but saying something that the speaker is incredulous about, as illustrated in (20-21):

(20) - I might not join the church. I might decide to go English.

- Are you kidding?

- No, I'm not. I don't know if I want to be Amish.

(21) - She died, he answered coolly.

- What? Are you kidding?

- No.

The implicational meaning of disbelief of this construction then gives rise to the illocutionary meaning of disagreement, as illustrated in (22-25):

(22) - But you don't look great in a bikini. Okay, Trace?

- No, are you kidding? She looks beautiful.

(23) - Can we watch some of it again?

- Oh, my God. Are you kidding?

(24) - You're under arrest for the murder of your wife.

- Are you kidding?

(25) - Money for U.S. racewalkers? Are you kidding? We don't even have shoe sponsors.

4. *No Kidding*

In this construction the speaker does not assert the truth of his proposition, but expresses his disbelief concerning the hearer's statement, as exemplified in (26):

(26) - All this blinding self-confidence and charisma you see when you look at me? It's just an act.

- No kidding.

- Nope. Inside I'm just a bashful country boy.

A.2.2. Constructions conveying the speaker's positive assessment.

The construction *Now You Are Talking* does not depict an action in progress, since confirming what somebody is doing is irrelevant; it rather reflects the writer's positive assessment in relation to something. It is the case of the following headlines:

(27) E-books – now you're talking

(28) Solar panels built with wind energy. Now you're talking.

B. Partially-specified constructions

The constructions *Wh- Do You Think You BE-present V-ing?* And *Don't You X* imply that the speaker disapproves of the hearer's behaviour.

1. *Wh- Do You Think You BE-present V-ing?*

Like the constructions *Who Are You* and *Who Do You Think You Are?*, this construction involves a Wh-interrogative pronoun and a subject pronoun *you*.

A representative listing of this construction is provided in (29):

(29) Who do you think you are talking to?

What do you think you are doing? Are you sure you are making the right decision?

What do you think you are doing, anyway? Now give me back that article.

Where do you think you are going? Don't you know it's dark outside?

Where do you think you are going? You are not leaving this house.

A number of considerations suggest themselves in the light of the examples in (29):

(i) In formal terms, the construction is a compound interrogative clause consisting of two clauses.

(ii) The matrix verb think appears in the present simple form with the second person singular pronoun *you* functioning as the subject. We must observe that *think* is the only verb eligible for occurrence in this construction. Thus, all other cognition verbs are systematically barred in the matrix verb-slot.

(iii) The embedded clause contains an obligatory constituent, namely a *wh*-word. The subject slot in the main clause may be filed by the pronouns *you, he* and *she.* The range of *wh*-words is restricted: *who, what, where.* Other *wh*-words are impossible: * *When do you think you are leaving? *Whose car do you think you are driving?*

Two restrictions are imposed on the verb in the embedded clause, a semantic restriction and a morphological restriction. First, the verb has to occur in the present continuous form. Second, the construction appears only to be felicitous with the verbs *talk/speak, do* and *go.*

(iv) There is an optional Y element, which make take various morphosyntactic realizations, as illustrated in (30):

(30) Where do you think you are going with that cigarette?

Where do you think you are going at this hour?

Just what do you think you are doing with my husband?

Like the constructions *Who Are You?* and *Who Do You Think You Are?*, this construction is semantically grounded on the high-level metonymy ACTION FOR (ASSESSED) RESULT.

2. *Don't You X*

This construction is to be interpreted as a prohibition and carries an implicational meaning of anger in such contexts as those in (31):

(31) Don't you ever lay a hand on me again like that.

Don't you speak to my daughter like that.

You scared the dickens out of us! Don't you go on that roof again, you hear me?

The addition of the semi-modal *dare* makes the implicature stronger:

(32) Don't you dare touch me.

Don't you dare lie to me.

Don't you dare laugh.

Don't you dare say that again.

It is worth noting that in other contexts the construction conveys the idea that the speaker wishes to bring some relief to the hearer, who is worried or frightened about something. The verb slot is filled by a feeling verb:

(33) Don't you worry, my dear girl. After all, you've been through quite enough

Don't you worry, sweetie. I'll always be here.

Don't you be afraid. I'll be fine.

3. *X Is Like Impossible To Y*

Beside conveying the idea that the speaker disapproves of the behaviour of the addressee or a third entity, this construction has an illocutionary value of complaint.

The construction exhibits a few morphosyntactic constraints. The subject slot must be filled by a second or third person pronoun (*you, he, she*) as shown in (34). First person pronouns are disallowed:

(34) He's like impossible to buy presents for.

She's like impossible to live with these days.

The lexical item *like* functions as a hedge that weakens the speaker's complaint.

4. *I Thought (That) You Would X*

This construction conveys the speaker's judgment about the factuality of an event. The speaker is certain about the truth of the proposition described in the utterance.

The construction displays the following morphosyntactic features:

    (i) In structural terms, the construction is a compound affirmative sentence consisting of two clauses.

    (ii) The matrix verb think appears in the past simple form with the first person singular pronoun I in the subject slot. The past form makes the implicational meaning more indirect (*modal remoteness,* see Huddleston and Pullum 2002).[22]

    (iii)The embedded clause contains two obligatory constituents: (1) the modal verb *would* and (2) the subject pronoun *you.*

This construction receives a literal reading in some contexts, where it is to be understood as a hypothesis made by the speaker in relation to the addressee's behaviour, as shown in (35):

    (35) I thought you would be home later.

        I thought you would never ask.

        I thought you would understand.

        I thought you would never get here.

        I thought you would come.

In other contexts, however, the construction triggers the implication that the speaker is certain that the state of affairs described in the proposition is beneficial to the hearer. The rationale behind this construction goes as follows:

S has done something > S has done something that S believes is in H's benefit and that H is aware is beneficial for him> S has done something in H's benefit.

By way of illustration, consider the following examples:

    (36) - Oh, look at that [a tie]. Very nice.

        - I thought you'd enjoy owning one without a stain.

    (37) - These photos of Paris are great!

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[22] Huddleston and Pullum.

- I thought you would enjoy some cool new pictures.

(38) - I'm really having a fantastic time.

- I thought you would find that trip interesting.

(39) - The book is amazing!

- I thought you would find it interesting.

A further set of partially-filled constructions carry the implicational meaning of challenge. A prime example is the construction *Name X.*

5. *Name X.*

This is a dyadic construction in which the speaker, who is doubtful about the truth of the hearer's proposition, challenges him to demonstrate it through exemplification. The speaker's invitation may take different forms:

-   a rhetorical question such as that in (40):

(40) - Why would you be sitting in a miserable jungle with canines?

- For lots of reasons.

- Name two. No. Just name one.

The question actually means "you are mad to go and sit in a miserable jungle with canines".

-   a direct challenge:

(41) - You don't even know a single song she sang.

- I do so.

- Name some songs. Name one.

-   a question or statement that directly challenges the truth of the hearer's proposition:

(42) - We've had lots of adventures too.

- Have we?

- Of course!

- Name one.

(43) - I hate them plenty.

- You are such a liar. Name one person you hate.

In all the examples the construction *Name X* is a response to the hearer evading the speaker's challenge.

6. *You Should See X*

In this construction the X element is realized by a noun phrase.

The sentences exploiting this construction express the speaker's intention to mitigate the negative effect of the situation depicted in the utterance, as in (44):

(44) - It's starting to get cold.

- Don't complain. You should see this place in black fly season.

The meaning of mitigation may be yielded through the speaker's implication that he, something belonging to him, or a third human entity is affected to a higher degree by the state of affairs described in the sentence. Look at the examples in (45-46):

(45) - My wife is a witch.

- Cheer up. You should see my wife.

(46) If you think I am cute, you should see my uncle.

If I'm crazy, you should see my sister.

If you think I'm handsome, you should see my Daddy.

The implication may be grounded on the metonymy ENTITY FOR STATE, as in (47):

(47) You should see my garage. It's a nightmare.

In the last example the place (i.e. the garage) stands for the state in which it is, i.e. a mess.

3. Conclusion

In the present contribution we have outlined a proposal for the analysis of implicational constructions within the framework of the Lexical Constructional Model, a

comprehensive model of language which fully integrates pragmatic and discourse meaning in grammatical description. Implicational constructions, which in the LCM pertain to level 2 of grammatical description (i.e. implicature), account for heavily conventionalized meaning implications based on low-level situational cognitive models. This means that implications are accessed directly through conventionalized for-meaning pairings. The study reveals that the constructions display a degree of variation on both the syntactic and pragmatic levels. In a pragmatic view, three types of implicational meaning are to be distinguished:

(i) Implicational meaning connected with the speaker's judgment about the hearer's behaviour. Thus, the constructions *Who Are You?, Who Do You Think You Are?, Wh-Do You Think You BE-present V-ing?, Don't You X, X Is Like Impossible To Y*, *I Know/See You* and *Don't You Have Anything To Say?* convey the idea that the speaker disapproves of the hearer's behaviour.

(ii) Implicational meaning related to the speaker's judgment about the factuality of an event. This is the kind of meaning yielded by the construction *I Thought You Would X, Name X, Are You Crazy/Insane?, What Are You Talking About?, Are You Kidding?, No Kidding*.

(iii) Implicational meaning linked to the speaker's attitude in relation to the situation depicted in the sentence. The constructions and *Now You Are Talking* and *You Should See X* carry this implication.

The findings also show that the implicational meaning may give rise to an illocutionary meaning. A telling example is provided by the constructions *Who Are You?, Who Do You Think You Are?,Wh- Do You Think You BE-present V-ing?* and *X Is Like Impossible To Y*. The conventional implication underlying these constructions gives rise to an illocutionary value of complaint.

The study has highlighted several facts. First, semantic and pragmatic meaning is produced through a constructional mechanism in a way that it can be said to be linguistically encoded. This fact gives proof of the intricate interaction of grammar, semantics and pragmatics.

Second, the meaning implications of level-2 constructions is based on low-level situational cognitive models. A low-level situational cognitive model is conceived as a conventional series of events that are coherently related to one another. The first event

would be the previous condition for the implication to be derived. The literal meaning of the construction would represent the core event, and the last event would be the conventional implication.

Third, the study has corroborated the LCM's assumption about the metonymic grounding of a range of low-level situational cognitive models. This is illustrated by the constructions *Who Are You?, Who Do You Think You Are?,Wh- Do You Think You BE-present V-ing?*, which hinge upon the high-level (generic) metonymy ACTION FOR (ASSESSED) RESULT.

Finally, it has been argued that a few constructions with the same implicational meaning belong to a constructional family in the sense of form-function pairings.

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